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Abstract. There are increasing concerns relating to cybersecurity of healthcare 
data and medical devices. Cybersecurity in this sector is particularly important 
given the criticality of healthcare systems, the impacts of a breach or cyberattack 
(including in the worst instance, potential physical harm to patients) and the value 
of healthcare data to criminals. Technology design is important for cybersecurity, 
but it is also necessary to understand the insecure behaviours prevalent within 
healthcare. It is vital to identify the drivers behind these behaviours, i.e., why 
staff may engage in insecure behaviour including their goals and motivations 
and/or perceived barriers preventing secure behaviour. To achieve this, in-depth 
interviews with 50 staff were conducted at three healthcare sites, across three 
countries (Ireland, Italy and Greece). A range of seven insecure behaviours were 
reported: Poor computer and user account security; Unsafe e-mail use; Use of 
USBs and personal devices; Remote access and home working; Lack of encryp-
tion, backups and updates; Use of connected medical devices; and poor physical 
security. Thematic analysis revealed four key facilitators of insecure behaviour: 
Lack of awareness and experience,  Shadow working processes, Behaviour pri-
oritisation and Environmental appropriateness. The findings suggest three key 
barriers to security: i) Security perceived as a barrier to productivity and/or pa-
tient care; ii) Poor awareness of consequences of behaviour; and iii) a lack of 
policies and reinforcement of secure behaviour. Implications for future research 
are presented. 
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1 Introduction 
Cybersecurity in healthcare is of increasing concern. New technological interventions 
continue to improve the treatment of a wide range of medical issues, and undoubtedly, 
healthcare technology has potential to save, and enhance, human life [1–3]. Many hos-
pitals now operate using a complex interconnected network of IT systems and devices. 
This includes connected health devices and administration systems storing electronic 
health patient records (EHRs). Hospitals and clinics also rely upon remote working 
and/or the transfer of test results and other sensitive data via electronic channels [4]. 
Unfortunately, an increase in new technology and interconnectivity also introduces new 
security vulnerabilities and challenges [5, 6]. This is not purely a technical problem, 
but a complex sociotechnical one that will only be solved by understanding ways in 
which technology and humans can interact to create the strongest defences; as well as 
the way that this interaction can create vulnerabilities.  
Healthcare is an attractive target for cybercrime for two fundamental reasons: it is a 
rich source of valuable data [4] and its defenses are weak [6]. The mass media high-
lights that vulnerabilities within healthcare are being exploited [7, 8], and the sector 
urgently needs to increase its resilience against cyberattacks and breaches [6, 8].  
Breaches can reduce patient trust, cripple health systems and threaten human life [9]. 
The WannaCry attack in 2017 is a key example of the type of consequences that 
cyberattacks can have within the healthcare sector [10]. WannaCry was a ransomware 
attack which affected computers in more than 100 countries. The National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) England was amongst those affected. with 80 (34%) NHS trusts, 603 pri-
mary care organisations and 595 GP practices infected by the ransomware. This re-
sulted in the cancellation of over 19,000 patient appointments, and a substantial finan-
cial cost to the NHS [11]. Around the world, ransomware attacks are still being experi-
enced, disrupting services, and even forcing some practitioners to quit the healthcare 
sector [12] 
Although technological protection such as strong firewalls and antivirus can go some 
way towards protecting against cyberthreat; strong cybersecurity also relies upon se-
cure staff behaviour, which has largely been ignored [6]. Cybersecurity is not just a 
technical problem, but a complex sociotechnical problem [13]. Staff behaviour has been 
shown to be one of the major contributors to cybersecurity vulnerability [4] and humans 
have often been described as cybersecurity’s ‘weakest link’ [14]. However, it is im-
portant to recognise that staff can also be one of the strongest links in cybersecurity, 
when secure employee behaviour acts – in effect – as a ‘human firewall’ [6].  
Whilst in some instances, staff misbehaviour is deliberate, i.e., deliberate insider 
threat. A significant proportion of cyberattacks and breaches are unintentional conse-
quences of staff behaviours that introduce vulnerability without malicious intent [4]. 
Healthcare represents a unique environment, one where staff prioritise effective and 
efficient patient care. Understandably, cybersecurity may not be the primary focus dur-
ing their day-to-day working lives. Staff working within this sector also report being 
overworked, fatigued and stressed [15–18]. This creates psychosocial risks for cyber-
security [19]. It is important that research identifies key vulnerabilities in staff behav-
iour and investigates how to address these in a manner that does not burden staff and/or 
negatively impact upon patient care. In order to do this, it is necessary to identify the 
driving factors behind staffs’ insecure behaviour, for example is this behaviour driven 
by a need to save time? Due to a lack of awareness? Or some other factor(s)? Previous 
research shows a range of factors which can influence secure or insecure behaviour, 
including for example self-efficacy, attitudes, external influences, coping and threat 
evaluation [20]. Many insecure behaviours have been found to be instrumental, rea-
soned and conducted as a means to an end, e.g., to save time [4]. Therefore, effective 
interventions can only be designed following the identification of drivers behind inse-
cure behaviour [4]. This study addresses this gap in the current literature through a 
series of in-depth focus groups and interviews with healthcare staff across three sites, 
and three countries (Ireland, Italy and Greece); enabling the exploration and identifica-
tion of key barriers to cybersecurity in the healthcare environment. 
To summarise the main contributions of this study are: 
 Identification of insecure behaviour(s) by healthcare staff 
 Identification of the key factors facilitating insecure behaviour(s) and/or providing 
barriers to more secure behaviour 
 Preliminary discussion of the implications of these findings for the design of inter-
ventions and the role of HCI in facilitating secure behaviour. 
2 Methodology 
Three focus group sessions took place across three sites: Gemelli hospital in Rome, the 
7th Health Region of Crete, and the HSE SSW Hospital Group, Ireland. These sessions 
were conducted face-to-face at the hospital location or remotely via Skype. Each ses-
sion lasted between 45-60 minutes, and included between 2-9 staff members. A total of 
50 staff took part.  A range of healthcare staff were included from administration staff, 
doctors, nurses, IT staff, etc. (Table 1). 
Table 1. Job Roles 
Location Job Role 
Gemelli Hospital, Rome 
Lab Technicians 
Administration Staff 
IT Team 
7th Health Region of Crete 
(7HRC) 
IT Teams across 2 different hospitals 
Biomedical Engineers 
Health Centre Staff (nurses, GPs, health workers) 
Managers 
The HSE SSW Hospital 
Group, Ireland 
Lab Technicians 
Administration Staff 
Medical Consultants 
Finance Staff 
Emergency staff including paramedics and ambu-
lance staff 
Nurses 
Doctors 
 
During the focus group, the facilitators asked opened ended questions focusing upon 
the following areas: 
 Awareness of any previous incidents at the hospital they would describe as cyber-
related 
 Type of cybersecurity risks that staff felt were of most concern within the hospital 
 The type of data and technology that staff interact with on a daily basis and the per-
ceived security of this technology 
 Security of staff behaviour and any risky behaviours that they were aware of 
 General awareness of potential cyber-risk and vulnerability to attack. 
 
For those interviewees that could not attend the focus groups (for example, due to 
unforeseen patient emergencies), we collected additional survey-based responses to 
these questions. The results were analysed using thematic analysis [21] to identify key 
themes. Ethical approval was granted by Northumbria University ethics committee be-
fore commencing.  
3 Results 
This section describes the five themes that developed in the analysis. The first details 
the type of insecure cybersecurity behaviours occurring across the healthcare sites. The 
remaining four themes explain key facilitators underpinning these behaviours: Lack of 
awareness and experience; Shadow working processes; Behaviour prioritization and 
Environmental appropriateness. 
3.1  Insecure Cybersecurity Behaviours 
Within this theme, seven types of insecure cybersecurity behaviours were identified 
that would pose a risk to healthcare institutions: Poor computer and user account se-
curity; Unsafe e-mail use; Use of USBs and personal devices; Remote access and home 
working; Lack of encryption, backups and updates; Use of connected medical devices; 
and poor physical security. These were identified as risk behaviours as they have been 
linked to increased cybersecurity risk in the literature [22]. 
Poor Computer and User Account Security  
Concerns around the security of login credentials and computer access were preva-
lent across all three sites. Two major concerns were noted: Open workstations within 
the hospital and poor password security. 
Many participants reported that computers within the healthcare environment are 
often used/shared by many different users. To save time logging in and out of their 
individual accounts, staff report leaving workstations logged into a single staff user 
account. Because of this, it is common to find open workstations throughout the hospi-
tal. Users were particularly likely to leave a computer logged into a single staff mem-
bers account within the labs – where it was perceived that only known individuals 
would have physical access to the computer. This suggests that trust amongst col-
leagues plays a role in this behaviour.  
Password security was a subject over which both the medical staff and the IT staff 
expressed frustration. IT staff described poor password security as a “single point of 
[security] failure”. We identified three key areas of concern: repetition of passwords, 
writing passwords down, and use of automatic login/remember me options on the work-
stations. Within the hospital, systems are in place that require employees to change their 
work passwords periodically (usually around every 2-3 months). The system does not 
allow staff to use the previous 2-3 passwords, however some staff report simply using 
the same 3-4 passwords on a rotating cycle to get around this, and to help them remem-
ber their passwords. Staff report frustration that it is “not possible to remember 20 dif-
ferent passwords” – so users use the same passwords across multiple systems as often 
as possible (often the same password they use for personal computer and internet use). 
As aforementioned, junior and admin staff often use senior staff login credentials; due 
to this they tend to be the first to receive the notice that the current password is about 
to expire. Consequently, junior and admin staff often change doctors and directors’ 
passwords. This could result in passwords that may be difficult for the senior staff to 
remember (due to a lack of personal salience).  
Systems generally generate specific password requirements (e.g., the password must 
be more than a specified number of letters, contain a number or symbol, etc.). This is 
designed to support secure password choices; however, staff report that these rules vary 
across the different platforms that they use and this can lead to frustration. All of the 
factors (number of passwords required, regular need to update passwords, staff member 
changing others’ passwords, and differing password requirements) can contribute to 
difficulty in password memorability. Consequently, many staff report that passwords 
are written down - often on sticky labels attached to computer monitors, visible by eve-
ryone. Many computer systems also ask staff if they would like the computer to auto-
matically remember their login credentials, e.g., by ticking “remember me” or “save 
password”. This is not a recommended security behaviour, particularly on shared de-
vices, however, staff often accept this option to save time and forgotten passwords. 
Staff do not generally use a secure password manager to remember passwords (e.g., 
KeyPass), with the exception of some IT staff. While ‘remember me’ may improve 
usability it has an unintended consequence for security. 
Phishing 
Staff use e-mail on a daily basis, and we identified concerns around dealing with 
phishing emails which may lead to stolen credentials or introduction of malware into 
the system. Staff reported phishing e-mails as a regular, ever increasing occurrence, and 
IT staff described it as a key cause for concern. Although spam filters are in place, these 
often fail to keep up with ever-evolving phishing approaches and do not always cor-
rectly identify e-mails as spam. Conversely, important e-mails can also be incorrectly 
diverted to the spam folder – providing a potential barrier to staff productivity. Further-
more, reliance upon spam filters could provide staff with a false sense of security and 
the inaccurate assumption that those e-mails which reach their inbox must be ‘safe’. 
Therefore, training and staff awareness is important. 
At some of the hospitals, IT staff send regular internal e-mails warning staff not to 
open attachments. However, staff perceive this advice as unfeasible as they often need 
to open email attachments to do their job. Medical reports and assessments are often 
sent as email attachments by patients, patients’ friends/family, and by other clinics and 
medical facilities (e.g., clinics across the region). Due to staff not knowing who will be 
e-mailing the document(s), they cannot rely upon recognising the e-mail address to 
identify if this is a genuine/safe e-mail. Instead, staff rely upon recognising (or search-
ing for) the patient’s name in the email subject box. This introduces significant vulner-
ability to exploitation. In addition to being unfeasible, advice from IT to not open at-
tachments was perceived as contradictory, as genuine internal e-mails from IT and man-
agement often include links or attachments. 
Use of USBs and Personal Devices 
Staff reported regular use of USB sticks to save and transfer data at work. USBs are 
typically their own personal devices, not supplied by their employer nor used exclu-
sively for work. All levels of staff reported using USBs, including junior and admin 
(e.g., to pass files to senior staff and directors), doctors, nurses, hospital residents (i.e., 
students) and IT staff. Perhaps even more concerning, external visitors and patients 
often bring their records on USB sticks to the hospital (e.g., reports from other clinics). 
These USBs are plugged straight into the hospital workstations without any prior safety 
procedures. These workstations are connected to the hospital network and not isolated 
machines. Sites differed in regards to whether an antivirus automatically scans USB 
devices when they are inserted into a computer; however even if this is activated it may 
not stop malware spreading. To try to minimise risk, some IT teams have closed the 
USB ports on specific workstations (e.g., computers within the radiology department) 
but this is not generally the norm across most machines. 
Staff generally perceived no danger related to USB use, with the exception of the IT 
and technical teams who expressed concern but also regarded USB usage as necessary, 
and therefore unavoidable. Indeed, in some roles, USBs actually form part of the com-
pulsory method for staff to confirm their identity by electronic signature.   
In addition to USB sticks, staff bring other personal devices to work – such as lap-
tops and smartphones (with many staff accessing work e-mail via their personal 
smartphone). Most staff reported that personal devices are only permitted to connect to 
the free public WiFi and not to the main hospital network. However, IT and technical 
staff described struggling to monitor and prevent staff from plugging their devices di-
rectly into the hospital network using Ethernet cables. This can be prevented by having 
ports paired with devices, however this is limiting when equipment is being regularly 
moved around the environment. In some limited circumstances, personal laptops can 
be connected to the hospital network with prior permission from IT. For those sites in 
remote, rural areas or small practices, it is more common for staff members to use their 
own devices for work. In these circumstances there are not always restrictions on con-
necting these devices to the hospital systems. Lost or stolen devices pose a significant 
security concern, as IT do not install software to enable them to remotely wipe the 
device. 
For some IT staff, the lack of a clear policy against bringing your own device to 
work is seen as a big problem. Unfortunately, any changes would have to be enforced 
by the governance board, who were generally described as lacking a “security mind-
set” and being reactive rather than proactive (i.e., waiting until something happens be-
fore acting rather than putting preventative measures in place). 
Lack of Encryption, Backups and Updates 
Alarmingly, no staff reported regularly encrypting data before transmitting it within 
- or particularly outside - of the hospital. This means that data being shared (and ac-
cessed on personal devices) represents an even greater vulnerability. Staff reported 
never being instructed – or taught – to encrypt files. A minority of the sites require staff 
to use SSL to send e-mails, and some departments (e.g., accounting) use digital signa-
tures to exchange files, but this was in the minority. 
Staff demonstrated a significant lack of awareness in relation to data backups, with 
most simply ‘assuming’ that backups took place automatically. Staff perceived backups 
as something that would be managed by IT or the department head – but they were not 
sure whether this was actually the case. In most cases this is correct, although staff 
should be made more aware what is and is not backed up from different devices. For 
instance, staff described how one senior manager’s workstation could not be re-estab-
lished after a ransomware attack as the manager had switched off the automatic backup 
software. Staff also reported a reluctance to install software updates on the workstations 
as they perceived these as problematic, e.g., “every update breaks one of the systems”. 
Installation problems can result in time away from their job to solve the problem – often 
involving liaising with IT and/or external businesses responsible for the software or 
system. Therefore, although systems often alert staff when updates are required, these 
alerts are often dismissed by repeated use of the “remind me later” button. Additionally, 
staff often do not have time to shut down the system for upgrades, for example trans-
plant personnel work 24/7 and do not perceive there to be a suitable time to shut down 
the workstations for updating. 
Use of Connected Medical Devices 
Some sites use a range of connected medical devices (i.e., devices connected to the 
internet) such as monographs, CT scanners, and MRI scanners. In general, staff per-
ceived connected devices to be introducing new challenges and threats – that many did 
not feel prepared nor trained for.  
For some of these devices, remote access is not possible – i.e., these cannot be con-
trolled or accessed from outside of the hospital. This is typically achieved by the de-
vices being on a separate internal network. However, for other devices, remote access 
is required by the device suppliers (e.g., to adjust device settings). This again raises 
security issues. These issues can be complex to address as some responsibility for con-
nected medical devices lies with the biomedical engineers, rather than IT – and IT staff 
describe the biomedical engineers as being “focused upon usability rather than secu-
rity”. IT staff also described the software used for medical devices as typically outdated 
and unsupported. This is concerning as it makes updating and patching impossible.  
Poor Physical Security 
In addition to more traditional cybersecurity risks, insecure physical access to 
healthcare facilities was also a concern for some sites. Facilities were often reported as 
being easy to enter with a lack of substantial physical barriers to prevent unauthorised 
access. Staff described unauthorised people frequently entering ‘staff only’ areas. This 
is particularly problematic in large hospitals where staff are unable to identify or rec-
ognise all of their colleagues. Furthermore, although offices may be locked, there are 
certain areas such as nurses and doctors’ workstations which are always accessible. 
Security cameras have been installed in some locations to improve security, but the lack 
of additional physical security measures remains an issue. 
3.2 Lack of Awareness and Experience 
This theme explores participants lack of personal awareness of cyberattacks in their 
workplace and the potential consequences of their actions.  
While awareness of cyberthreats and data breaches in general is high, previous ex-
perience of cyber breaches or attacks was low across all three sites. Although staff dis-
played some awareness of cyberbreaches that have occurred in healthcare more gener-
ally, the sites themselves have experienced very few incidents. Those incidents that 
have occurred were described as minor, e.g., ransomware that had been successfully 
addressed (without payment) due to backups of the data. No critical incidents had been 
experienced, with some staff members describing the hospitals as having “been lucky 
so far”. This lack of learned experience may facilitate insecure behaviours. For exam-
ple, some staff members reflected upon the lack of negative effects they have personally 
experienced despite using the internet and technology on a daily basis (“well nothing 
bad has happened so far!”). This could lead staff to underestimate the prevalence of 
cyberbreaches and/or lead them to feel that their current behaviour must be ‘safe’ thus 
reinforcing the behaviour, even if this is not accurate.  
Risk Awareness and Lack of Cybersecurity Training  
Although many staff were aware that they are expected to behave securely, most 
demonstrated a lack of understanding why certain behaviours were important. Often, 
they did not identify potential risks associated with their behaviour. For example, we 
asked whether staff thought it possible that their own workstation use could affect med-
ical equipment and medical devices in the wider hospital. Generally, staff did not think 
this was possible nor likely. They did not recognise that they could potentially introduce 
malware into the wider hospital system. Interestingly, those staff members who did 
identify that it was possible for some workstation use to impact upon medical devices 
within the hospital, regarded this as more of an issue for those working in close physical 
proximity to the medical equipment: 
“This is more of a risk for those working near the instruments, e.g., in the surgery” 
“[We are] too peripheral to influence things like that. [As we are] so far removed 
from the medical system” 
One staff member explained that they previously acted more securely (e.g., always 
using their own computer login) when they worked in a department that was more “cen-
tral to the hospital” as they perceived this to be more vulnerable.  
In addition to physical proximity, type of computer usage was also perceived to af-
fect risk: 
“I only read and see things when I use the computers, I do not input data – therefore 
I do not see this as a danger [to the system or the hospital]” 
This lack of awareness is troubling, and one that should be addressed through staff 
training and education. A lack of cybersecurity training was one of the issues raised by 
the majority of staff, with many feeling underprepared and unaware of how to use tech-
nology securely. Some staff reported receiving no formal computer or cybersecurity 
teaching and described being self-taught and/or relying on learning by observing their 
colleagues. In particular, admin staff expressed frustration with their lack of training 
stating that they felt “out of the loop” and “always the last staff members to be trained 
(if at all)”. One admin staff member described being most likely to be “forgotten about, 
despite having everyone’s’ passwords”. They felt that they are “not considered im-
portant for security” and that this is due to others in their employment not understanding 
what tasks they actually do (as per our previous discussion on shadow working). 
Even some IT staff reported not receiving cybersecurity training and reported using 
their own initiative to communicate with other colleagues by email to warn about risks 
they have informally learned about. Therefore, ad-hoc communication – as a result of 
staff initiative - occurs in some organisations but there is a lack of formal training. Some 
of the hospital staff did report that new training is being developed and that this is be-
ginning to be rolled out, which will likely include some cybersecurity content. 
3.3 Shadow Working Processes 
This theme refers to behaviours which are occurring within healthcare institutions to 
enable efficient working practices, but which are clearly going against policy and in 
some cases even against country laws such as staff members sharing login credentials, 
bypassing official communication channels and remote working. The staff enact these 
behaviours in good faith believing they enable their job without a risk to cybersecurity. 
In some instances, senior management and IT are well aware of these behaviours, but 
are at a loss as to how these behaviours can be changed.  
Sharing Login Credentials 
Sharing of personal login credentials was prevalent. Staff regard sharing logins as a 
necessity in order to complete their daily duties. Unauthorised use of login credentials 
can actually be classified as a criminal behaviour [23], although it is possible that staff 
are not aware of this. A major driver behind the sharing of login credentials is an in-
consistency between staff system access levels and the tasks that they are expected to 
perform by their immediate managers. Administration and junior doctors are restricted 
in regards to system access privileges, therefore they cannot do a lot of the tasks that 
senior staff expect of them. However, senior staff do not always have time to do the 
more administrative elements of their job due to a high workload, time pressure and a 
focus upon delivering efficient patient care. As one participant states “Surgeons could 
not do surgery if they spent all their time making appointments”. Therefore, to enable 
them to focus their time more efficiently, senior staff delegate tasks such as prescribing, 
making appointments, and entering written notes into the system to more junior mem-
bers of staff. To work around junior staff access restrictions, senior staff members share 
their own login credentials. In addition to cybersecurity and legal concerns, this behav-
iour also raises safety concerns. For example, non-medical staff are reportedly entering 
information from medical notes (including diagnoses) onto hospital systems. Handwrit-
ten notes can leave a degree of interpretation, and the staff member inputting the infor-
mation often has to decide which categories and options they select on the computer 
system to accurately reflect the patient’s condition and treatment. Mistakes could have 
significant consequences, despite this workaround being driven by staff motivation to 
improve patient care. 
This is a problem that is not easily solved by technology alone, clear governance and 
workload reduction is required. We must ensure that the true way that hospitals work 
is recognized, and changes to policy are in place to facilitate effective patient care with-
out putting safety at risk Literature suggests that system design is adding to staff burden 
through poor usability of all devices and software eg, electronic health records [24]. 
Bypassing Official Communication Channels 
We found evidence of staff bypassing official communication channels and emailing 
sensitive patient information in an insecure manner. Some medical staff reported e-
mailing sensitive patient information (including detailed descriptions of a patient’s con-
dition and/or treatment) to a large group of their colleagues. This ensures that all of 
their colleagues are updated and that all key information about the patient and their 
current condition is easily accessible and summarised in one place. This raises concerns 
over the security and privacy of the e-mailed data (e.g., staff indicated that there is a 
lack of discrimination as to which colleagues are copied into the e-mails, and as afore-
mentioned the data is not encrypted). Furthermore, if information is being sent via e-
mail, it is possible that this is not being updated on the central system and therefore 
vital information may be missed from the patient’s electronic health record. Staff also 
report e-mailing sensitive information to their personal home e-mail to enable them to 
work from home. 
Interestingly, staff at one site described using the smartphone messenger application, 
WhatsApp, to communicate with their work colleagues. This included using the app to 
send patient details, test results and/or photos of the patient to one another, in order to 
ask their opinion. Staff perceive WhatsApp as a quicker, more convenient method to 
quickly share information/photos, compared to using the official systems. WhatsApp 
can reduce staff burden, enabling them to focus on patient care (e.g., allowing them to 
stay by the patient’s bed whilst gathering second opinions rather than leaving to use a 
workstation). Although this behaviour was only reported at one of the three sites within 
this sample, previous studies have identified WhatsApp usage at other healthcare sites 
[25] suggesting this is not an isolated occurrence. Although this method of communi-
cation may be quick, convenient and effective – it can also pose security risks when 
patient data is being sent via a third-party application; particularly one that is often sent 
and/or received on personal mobile devices and while WhatsApp is encrypted the im-
ages may also reside on the phone.  
Remote Access and Home Working 
Remote access to the hospital network and home working was not the norm, for most 
staff in our sample. Home working was not an official policy for most sites. However, 
it is possible for certain members of staff if required – and if authorisation to do so is 
provided by the IT team. For example, staff responsible for the allocation of organ 
transplants use remote access to enable them to quickly allocate a donor as soon as an 
organ becomes available, without first needing to travel to the hospital. For some sites, 
as a security measure, every remote access connection has to be approved by someone 
within the hospital (e.g., by calling the hospital and asking another member of staff to 
press a button to approve the remote access). The IT team at some of the sites are also 
able to restrict the parts of the system that can be accessed remotely.  
In comparison to remote access, saving hospital files onto personal devices to allow 
home working was reported more frequently. Interestingly some staff commented that 
even “the chiefs do it” – as social learning theory would predict [Akers, R. L., & Jensen, 
G. F. (Eds.). (2011). Social learning theory and the explanation of crime (Vol. 1). Trans-
action Publishers.] the behavior of others is influencing and/or reinforcing this behav-
iour. Staff report using personal devices on public WiFi networks, for example whilst 
travelling. Although staff are aware that this could pose some risk, they are also keen 
to be actively working – and contactable - whilst outside of the hospital; providing 
another example of a situation where staff feel conflicted between acting securely and 
productivity. 
3.4 Behaviour Prioritisation 
Staff demonstrated an awareness that their behaviour differs from that which is ex-
pected or advised (shadow behaviours) It is necessary to understand the underlying 
reasons for this behavior.  This theme acknowledges that cybersecurity is often per-
ceived as having low priority compared to other activities required at work. Participants 
prioritise (i) productivity and seeing patients, (ii) medical expenditure over cybersecu-
rity and that these priorities are reinforced by (iii) not enforcing cybersecurity policies.  
 Productivity 
Cybersecurity measures were often described by staff as counterproductive and time 
consuming. This is particularly undesirable in a healthcare setting, where patient care 
is understandably prioritised, and staff are overworked and under severe time pressure 
[26]. Anything that is seen as increasing staff burden will be negatively regarded by 
staff. For example, senior management may restrict staff computer access rights (e.g., 
to prevent computer settings being changed and new software being installed without 
an admin login). However, this is often perceived as a barrier to work through prevent-
ing installation of required software.  
Some staff also felt that security measures may be more focused upon monitoring or 
restricting staff, rather than improving security for staff and patients. This could poten-
tially affect their motivation to comply. Security measures will also be rejected if 
quicker workarounds are available, and/or if the measures are not perceived as effec-
tive. Due to these negative perceptions of security, particularly as a barrier to produc-
tivity and patient-care, senior management and IT technicians described cybersecurity 
as being a cultural issue – rather than a technical issue; One which requires a “culture 
change” and a shift in attitudes towards cybersecurity. 
Medical Spending Prioritised over Cybersecurity 
IT staff acknowledge that the healthcare environment is unique in that priorities must 
lie with patient care and saving lives – therefore it is not always easy to impose security 
requirements. They also report a lack of resources and/or budget for cybersecurity. For 
example, managers were perceived as not allocating adequate budget for cybersecurity, 
because they want to use this money to purchase something tangible, i.e., “something 
they can see” such as a hospital bed, or a new medical device. Due to budget constraints, 
cybersecurity tends to get missed from the business priorities. It was felt that govern-
mental changes may help to prioritise, enforce and regulate cybersecurity.  
Lack of Policy and Reinforcement of Safe Behaviour 
Staff reported a lack of cybersecurity policies at work, or a lack of reinforcement for 
any policies that do exist. Staff feel that there is a lack of structural, clear guidance and 
clarification regarding (un)desirable behaviours. When policies do exist, staff feel that 
this is unfortunately, never enforced – and conversely good behaviour is never re-
warded. Some work places require staff to sign a document to say they will abide by a 
security policy; however, IT staff feel that new staff often sign this document without 
actually reading it. IT staff described feeling hopeful that the introduction of the new 
EU Cybersecurity Act may help to address some of these problems around security 
policy and reinforcement. The new law imposes that the government identifies ‘critical 
structures’ and these structures will have to adopt extra security measures in an allo-
cated period of time. Hospitals are likely to be identified as critical structures. As the 
law only got approved on the 18th May 2019, IT staff are still in the stage of establish-
ing how to implement the requirements. Therefore, time will tell what impact this will 
have upon cybersecurity in healthcare. 
Staff reported feeling that cybersecurity only becomes a concern if there is a major 
incident and the employer and/or employees face legal action. For example, one site 
described how a previous court case found that a patient’s surgical report had been 
rewritten 8 times. This resulted in a new procedure being introduced to monitor and 
limit amendments to patient data, including the requirement for a clear audit trial. Other 
behaviours reported by the staff in our sample could potentially lead to legal action, 
e.g., sharing of login credentials [23], but this may not be widely enforced.  
Interestingly, reinforcement of secure behaviour may also come from unexpected 
sources. For example, some staff reported acting more securely depending upon the 
department that they are working in. One employee described only using their own 
login credentials when they worked in a department that used login times to record 
employees working hours. Therefore, using logins to record working hours had an un-
expected secondary benefit of increasing more secure behaviour through discouraging 
use of shared login credentials. 
3.5 Environmental Appropriateness  
This theme explains the ways that the work and systems fail to provide appropriate, 
flexible, mobile, efficient ways of working that the staff desire, in ways that are deemed 
secure. There is tension between official secure procedures and what staff see as essen-
tial within their work environment and current work culture. One example of this is 
system readiness. Staff raised concerns about the availability of equipment which led 
to them being apprehensive about automatic timeout of systems, switching users, and 
software updates.  
No-delay availability 
Automatic log-out after a period of inactivity, might improve cybersecurity but it is 
not implemented across all of the workstations. Auto log-out is not feasible on all com-
puters such as those on the ward, where it could potentially interfere with delivery of 
patient-care (e.g., if a doctor forgets their login credentials, or logging in and out is 
perceived to take too much time). For other workstations, even if implemented, auto 
log-out is ineffectual as the workstation is in constant use (e.g., by different staff). 
Current culture and need for change 
There was a perception that awareness of cybersecurity issues within the healthcare 
organisations was low, and needed to be improved. IT staff reported feeling that behav-
iour is slowly improving due to staff gaining some understanding of cybersecurity is-
sues, but that there is a long way to go before behavior would change. Many staff ex-
pressed dissatisfaction at not being kept well informed, nor receiving adequate training. 
Staff expressed a desire to be “kept in the loop” and in particular to be provided with 
explanations why – and how - certain behaviours are important for security. They ex-
pressed that in order to facilitate behaviour change, it is important that security 
measures are not just imposed upon staff but that staff are involved in the reasoning 
behind the changes. Some staff felt that being provided with relatable stories and/or 
real-life events could help illustrate importance and relevance – particularly as many of 
the staff have not experienced any adverse effects to suggest that change in their be-
haviour is necessary. Others felt that new regulations (e.g., GDPR) and policy could 
help influence behaviour. Staff (include those from IT) also identified that cybersecu-
rity procedures need to be easier to read and more user-friendly, to encourage staff to 
read them and to aid comprehension. One staff member suggested that it would be ben-
eficial to have a clear contact within the organisation, such as an easily accessible help-
line or cybersecurity champion, who they could approach for more information about 
cybersecurity issues. 
The majority of staff described their place of work as “understaffed and overworked” 
and for many, being too busy and under major time-constraints was seen as a key driver 
for unsafe behaviour. Security measures need to be realistic for the healthcare environ-
ment, user friendly, and time efficient. Current security measures can often be seen as 
burdensome, for example multiple login screens can be repetitive, frustrating and time 
consuming. Staff suggested that it would be beneficial if these systems were more co-
hesive; for example, if there was an easy way to update passwords (and other infor-
mation) across all systems without logging into each system individually. 
For IT staff, cybersecurity was perceived as a cultural issue. They perceived tech-
nical solutions to be available to deal with many cyberthreats, but felt that a culture 
shift in staff attitudes was needed in order to adequately improve cybersecurity. IT de-
scribed cybersecurity as an “everyday battle to keep things safe” and often described 
the elder members of staff – with a lot of experience and numerous years spent working 
in the healthcare environment – as one of the main groups acting insecurely. Interest-
ingly, they also perceived the youngest and/or newest employees to be acting inse-
curely, and suggested that there may be different factors influencing each group (e.g., 
elder staff not liking change or not being familiar with technology and younger staff 
being inexperienced at work and/or overconfident in their own ability to use technol-
ogy).  
As aforementioned, reinforcement of secure (or insecure) behaviour can sometimes 
come from unexpected sources. For example, some staff described access to their own 
personal information as a key motivator to prevent sharing of login credentials. Previ-
ously, some hospital systems allowed users to access their personal portal (including 
salary information) using their main staff login credentials. Staff did not like this as it 
meant users using their shared login information could see their private details. As a 
consequence, the system was changed so that personal salary information is now held 
on a separate system, requiring a separate login. Unknowingly, this change likely re-
moved one of main drivers preventing the sharing of login credentials. This provides 
food for thought when designing future systems. 
In addition to addressing staff behaviour and governmental regulation, staff feel that 
it would be beneficial for systems to be in place that enable risk assessment of cyber-
threat vulnerabilities, in the same manner that organisations can assess other security 
risks (e.g., physical risks). At the moment they feel that overall cybersecurity is weak 
as there are no method(s) to assess vulnerabilities. However, all staff described com-
puter systems in healthcare as paramount to their everyday jobs – showing that raising 
cybersecurity levels is critical. 
4 Recommendations for change 
This section pulls together recommendations for change to address the issues raised by 
staff.  
Standardisation 
 Password security options have evolved from the traditional view of secure pass-
words, to three random words which can be easier to remember (https://www.cyber-
essentialsonline.co.uk/the-latest-password-guidance-from-the-ncsc/). The medical 
community should agree a format (similar to how the finance industry consolidated 
on PIN format) and ensure all medical equipment universally follow that guideline. 
Research 
Research is needed in the following areas: 
 Securing legacy devices is a non-optional priority. Guidance on security, pre and 
post market, for medical devices is relatively new (e.g.  MDCG 2019-16 in Europe) 
and must be fully implemented into the development and post-market monitoring 
environment.  
 To identify a different policy for managing passwords. Changing passwords should 
not just be based on time elapsed (i.e., requiring periodic change). The hospital must 
also ensure they passwords are properly encrypted and that staff have a separate and 
strong password for email, which if hacked can be used to launch a phishing attack.  
 As technology improves and less phishing emails are getting through to staff, para-
doxically it is harder for people to detect a phishing email in a low signal environ-
ment [27]. If 100% elimination cannot be guaranteed, more research is required to 
establish an optimal level of fake phishing emails. This level can be maintained 
through phishing simulation training, to optimise human detection.  
 More work is need to establish how to effectively manage updates in relation to two 
key issues. Firstly, how to effectively schedule updates in 24/7 environments. Sec-
ondly, how to accurately predict downtime and ensure it is easy to recover if an 
update disrupts a system. 
 Research is required to explore how best to provide feedback to staff regarding the 
constant threat their establishment is under and the effectiveness of their behaviour, 
without creating an environment of constant fear that leads to dysfunctional coping 
and stress. This should be mindful of findings relating to Protection Motivation The-
ory [28] and the need to emphasise coping behaviours alongside threat information 
[29]. 
  
Technology improvements 
 Allow the local administrator to manage ‘remember me’ function and similar func-
tions which impact security. This will enable the removal of options such as remem-
ber me if this does not comply with local policies.  
 Explore means of enabling automatic change of user when staff physically move 
away from a device. More ethnographic research is required to establish how to 
maintain context (e.g., current patient record), when login changes between staff 
working on the same patient case.  
 An alternative, mobile, secure channel must be provided to support data transfer be-
tween people and locations. This is required for activities such as working from 
home, bringing in research and presentations to supervisors, and patients bringing in 
medical records.   
 A secure app, running on a smartphone which is approved by the medical industry 
and links directly to the electronic health records is needed to ensure central infor-
mation is up-to-date, easy to share between staff, and does not disrupt working at the 
patient bedside.  
 Encryption tools must be readily available and easy to use. Staff should be trained 
how to use these tools and made aware of the importance of encryption. 
 HCI must ensure that the design of all software is optimised to reduce the burden on 
staff. Usability, and consistency across device interfaces is key to reduce burden on 
staff, as well as for any security components.   
Ultimately, all tools must be easy to use and not add to the psychosocial stress of the 
healthcare staff.  
5 Conclusion 
Our overall findings suggest that insecure behaviours are commonplace across 
healthcare organisations, on an international scale; and awareness of the breadth of risks 
associated with these behaviours is generally low. Staff are aware of the external threats 
but not necessarily how their behaviours facilitate these threats. Awareness training is 
required to ensure that staff are more aware of the potential implications of their behav-
iour in the workplace. Staff within healthcare work within a very fast-paced and poten-
tially stressful environment, with a lot of time pressures and responsibilities that do not 
always facilitate secure behaviour. Current behaviours are engrained habits which co-
exist with a practical rationalisation that they are required to facilitate efficient patient 
care. Without awareness of what constitutes unsafe/risky behaviour and the potential 
consequences (including a lack of learned experience), it is not realistic to expect staff 
to behave securely. It is vital that they are clearly informed by their employer of what 
is expected of them, and why; and who to approach if they require any further infor-
mation or guidance.  
The administrators and junior medics in our interviews reported feeling as if their 
roles were not recognised or were regarded as unimportant. In addition to being demor-
alising for staff, this can also result in staff members not receiving adequate training. 
This is driven by shadow working, i.e., a discrepancy between the responsibilities cov-
ered in their official written job description, and the tasks that they actually conduct on 
a daily basis. These shadow work processes create a security weakness, in addition to 
potentially having a negative impact on staff wellbeing through a lack of recognition. 
We see this as a key area for improvement that requires further understanding of the 
organisational culture which has led to the existence of these shadow behaviours. Such 
recognition could be made in different ways, from the introduction of the role of med-
ical scribes to acknowledged responsibility for junior medics and remove the burden 
from senior medics.  
Due to the unique working environment within healthcare, there are limitations on 
the type of technological interventions which can be introduced. For example, it is not 
feasible to impose auto log-off on workstations where emergency access is required, 
nor to require staff to take several steps to access one system. It is vital that any inter-
ventions are user-friendly, time-efficient and non-burdensome; otherwise they will – at 
best, be ineffective (e.g., promoting staff to find ‘workarounds’) – or at worst, nega-
tively impact upon patient care and/or wellbeing. This need for quick, convenient sys-
tems is seen in the workarounds that staff have created, e.g., use of WhatsApp. 
Some issues may be more straightforward to, at least partially, address from a tech-
nological perspective, such as the use of USB devices and sharing of attachments. For 
example, screening USB devices on machines that are isolated from the main hospital 
network. However, it is still important that staff are kept informed of the importance 
and rationale behind these interventions. This will help to help facilitate their adoption 
and continued use, and minimise perceptions of security as simply a barrier to produc-
tivity and another “hoop to jump through” for no perceived reason or reward. 
In conclusion, the findings from this study highlight a range of insecure behaviours 
currently occurring within healthcare environments. No technology is a silver bullet 
ready to reduce cybersecurity risks. Rather, this complex socio-technical will be solved 
by understanding the underlying reasons for behavior, implementation of appropriate 
processes and appropriate design of technology.  
These findings have implications for the design of both behaviour change interven-
tions aiming to promote secure behavior and the design of technology itself to ensure 
that the secure use of technology is as easy as the insecure and not adding to the psy-
chosocial stress of the users. Further research should focus upon potential intervention 
techniques, including gathering feedback from healthcare staff around perceived ap-
propriateness, feasibility and acceptance. Engagement of the clinical leadership to shift 
cybersecurity conversations from technical to one linked to patient safety and organi-
zational resilience is needed. This means presenting cybersecurity data in terms of clin-
ical and business outcomes.  
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